How  People Update Beliefs about Climate Change: Good News and Bad News by Sunstein, Cass R. et al.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 102
Issue 6 September 2017 Article 1
How People Update Beliefs about Climate Change:
Good News and Bad News
Cass R. Sunstein
Harvard University
Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez
University College, London
Stephanie C. Lazzaro
University College, London
Tali Sharot
University College, London
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law and Politics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cass R. Sunstein, Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez, Stephanie C. Lazzaro, and Tali Sharot, How People Update Beliefs about Climate Change:
Good News and Bad News, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 1431 (2017)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol102/iss6/1
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\102-6\CRN603.txt unknown Seq: 1 25-SEP-17 11:00
HOW PEOPLE UPDATE BELIEFS ABOUT
CLIMATE CHANGE: GOOD NEWS
AND BAD NEWS
Cass R. Sunstein,† Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez,
Stephanie C. Lazzaro & Tali Sharot††
People are frequently exposed to competing evidence
about climate change.  We examined how new information
alters people’s beliefs.  We find that people who are not sure
that man-made climate change is occurring, and who do not
favor an international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, show a form of asymmetrical updating: They
change their beliefs in response to unexpected good news
(suggesting that average temperature rise is likely to be less
than previously thought) and fail to change their beliefs in
response to unexpected bad news (suggesting that average
temperature rise is likely to be greater than previously
thought).  By contrast, people who strongly believe that man-
made climate change is occurring, and who favor an interna-
tional agreement, show the opposite asymmetry: They change
their beliefs far more in response to unexpected bad news
(suggesting that average temperature rise is likely to be
greater than previously thought) than in response to unex-
pected good news (suggesting that average temperature rise is
likely to be smaller than previously thought).  The results sug-
gest that exposure to varied scientific evidence about climate
change may increase polarization within a population due to
asymmetrical updating.  We explore the implications of our
findings for how people will update their beliefs upon receiving
new evidence about climate change, and also for other beliefs
relevant to politics and law.
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People are exposed to a great deal of variable information
with respect to climate change.1  Within the United States, the
Environmental Protection Agency stated, “Increases in average
global temperatures are expected to be within the range of
0.5°F to 8.6°F by 2100, with a likely increase of at least 2.7°F
for all scenarios except the one representing the most
aggressive mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions.”2  That
range is extremely wide: 0.5°F is quite modest, whereas 8.6° F
would be catastrophic.3  It is easy to find projections near the
lower end of the range, and it is even easier to find projections
near the highest end, or even above it.4
Moreover, projections of anticipated warming have
changed significantly over time.5  There are also sharp
disagreements about the likely effects of different levels of
warming.6  For example, the three integrated assessment
models, used by the United States government under President
Obama to project the social cost of carbon, offer dramatically
different estimates of those effects, and they too change over
time.7  Some experts believe that those projections greatly
understate the existence of uncertainty and are therefore
essentially worthless.8  In their view, exceptionally wide ranges
1 For one account, see Michael Greenstone et al., Developing a Social Cost of
Carbon for US Regulatory Analysis: A Methodology and Interpretation, 7 REV.
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 23 (2013).  The social cost of carbon was upheld against a
variety of legal challenges in Zero Zone, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 832 F.3d 654,
677–80 (7th Cir. 2016).
2 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FUTURE OF CLIMATE CHANGE (Jan. 18, 2017)
https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/science/future.html [https://perma.cc/
KKU8-5JAQ].
3 See Martin L. Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of
Catastrophic Climate Change, 5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 275, 277–79 (2011).
4 See, e.g., WILLIAM NORDHAUS, THE CLIMATE CASINO: RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND
ECONOMICS FOR A WARMING WORLD 42–49 (2013); Weitzman, supra note 3, at R
277–79.
5 For a good overview, see NORDHAUS, supra note 4, at 42–66. R
6 Id. at 69–146 (discussing, for example, the impacts on ecological systems
and human health).
7 See Greenstone et al., supra note 1, at 23–25. R
8 See, e.g., Robert S. Pindyck, Climate Change Policy: What Do the Models
Tell Us? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19244, 2013), http:/
/www.nber.org/papers/w19244.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TV4-CJ5G].
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are the best that can be done with respect to likely warming,
and for damages, the ranges are too wide to be useful.
We aim here to investigate two simple questions: (1) How
do people update their beliefs when they receive new
information about likely warming? (2) How do people’s prior
attitudes affect their response to such information?  The
answers to these questions are valuable in themselves,
because they show how different groups, with different initial
views about climate change, will respond to new information.
Simple though they are, the answers also offer more general
lessons about how people will update their beliefs in response
to new information about contested questions in science,
politics, and law.
We find that people who are not sure that man-made
climate change is occurring, and unenthusiastic about an
international agreement, show a form of asymmetrical
updating: They change their beliefs far more in response to
unexpected good news, suggesting that average temperature
rise is likely to be (even) smaller than previously thought, than
in response to unexpected bad news, suggesting that average
temperature rise is likely to be larger than previously thought.
In fact, we do not find a statistically significant change in their
views in response to bad news at all.
By contrast, people who strongly believe that man-made
climate change is occurring, and who strongly favor an
international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
show the opposite asymmetry: They change their beliefs far
more in response to unexpected bad news, suggesting that
average temperature rise is likely to be even greater than
previously thought, than in response to unexpected good news,
suggesting that average temperature rise is likely to be smaller
than previously thought.  People with moderate beliefs about
climate change show no asymmetry.
These findings have evident connections with other work
on the formation and alteration of beliefs.  It is well known that
when people are confronted with balanced information on
political and legal issues, they often credit the information that
supports their antecedent convictions and disregard
information that contradicts it (“biased assimilation”).9  It
9 See, e.g., Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence,
37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979); John W. McHoskey, Case Closed?
On the John F. Kennedy Assassination: Biased Assimilation of Evidence and
Attitude Polarization, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 395 (2002); Geoffrey D.
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follows that if people come to a balanced presentation with
opposite priors, they are likely to polarize.  A more recent
finding is that some seemingly credible corrections of
erroneous political beliefs backfire; they strengthen people’s
commitment to their original beliefs.10
Outside of the domain of politics and law, good news with
respect to personal prospects typically has a stronger effect on
beliefs than bad news, regardless of priors.11  People are more
likely to update their beliefs if they receive information
suggesting (for example) that their likely longevity is greater
than they previously estimated than after receiving information
suggesting that it is shorter.  Not only do people update their
beliefs more upon receiving good personal news, they are also
more likely to do so in a Bayesian manner than when receiving
bad news.12
In line with these findings is one of our own: Weak
believers in man-made climate change adjust to unexpected
good news about the climate to a greater extent than to
unexpected bad news (which has essentially no impact).  But in
apparent contrast, we find that strong believers in man-made
climate change adjust to unexpected bad news about the
climate to a greater extent than to unexpected good news.  We
suggest that in the domains of politics and law, this form of
asymmetrical updating is likely to be pervasive and quite
important, increasing polarization in many areas of social,
political, and legal life.
I
THE STUDY
A. Participants
Three hundred and two volunteers (177 males, 125 fe-
males) living in the United States were recruited via Amazon
Munro et al., Biased Assimilation of Sociopolitical Arguments: Evaluating the 1996
U.S. Presidential Debate, 24 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 15 (2002).
10 Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of
Political Misperceptions, 32 POL. BEHAV. 303 (2010).
11 David Eil & Justin M. Rao, The Good News-Bad News Effect: Asymmetric
Processing of Objective Information About Yourself, 3 AM. ECON. J.:
MICROECONOMICS 114 (2011); Tali Sharot et al., How Unrealistic Optimism Is
Maintained in the Face of Reality, 14 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1475 (2011).
12 Eil & Rao, supra note 11; Tali Sharot & Neil Garrett, The Myth of a R
Pessimistic View of Optimistic Belief Updating – A Commentary on Shah et al.
(2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2811752 [http://
perma.cc/W5ZR-CEEE].
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Mechanical Turk to participate in an online study.13  Their
characteristics were as follows: age: 45.7% were 29 years old or
younger, 41.7% were 30-49 years old, 11.6% were 50-64 years
old, and 1.0% were over 64 years old; race: 73.8% identified
themselves as White, 11.3% as Asian, 7.6% as African Ameri-
can, 5.3% as Hispanic, 0.3% as Native American, and 1.7% as
Other; income: 25.8% earned less than $30K, 41.1% earned
$30K–$59K, 19.2% earned $60K–$89K, 7.6% earned
$90K–$119K, 3.0% earned $120K–$149K, and 3.3% earned
more than $150K; party affiliation: 49.7% of participants iden-
tified themselves as Democrats, 33.4% as Independents, and
16.9% as Republicans; education: 0.3% attained less than a
high school education, 10.6% a high school education, 38.1%
some college education, 38.4% a four-year college degree, 1.7%
a professional degree, 9.3% a master’s degree, and 1.7% a doc-
toral degree.  The study takes approximately two minutes to
complete and participants were paid $0.25 for participation.14
B. Tasks
Our goal was to examine whether and by how much people
will update their beliefs about the likely temperature rise after
receiving information that was better or worse than previously
received.  We hypothesized that people who strongly believe in
man-made climate change would be more reluctant to alter
their beliefs upon receiving unexpected good news (i.e., the
expected temperature rise is in fact lower than previously as-
sumed) than upon receiving unexpected bad news (i.e., the
expected temperature rise is in fact higher than previously as-
sumed).  We also hypothesized that those who were more skep-
tical about man-made climate change would show the opposite
pattern: They would be more likely to alter their beliefs upon
receiving unexpected good news (the expected temperature rise
is in fact lower than previously assumed) than bad news.
To test the two hypotheses, we first assessed participants’
attitudes.  Specifically, participants were asked three ques-
13 AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome
[https://perma.cc/SZ45-NSQX].  Respondents on MTurk, though not a nation-
ally representative sample, have been shown to be similar to respondents on most
other survey platforms.  Connor Huff & Dustin Tingley, “Who Are These People?”
Evaluating the Demographic Characteristics and Political Preferences of MTurk
Survey Respondents, RES. & POL., July–Sept. 2015, at 1 (2015).  Our goal was to
measure people’s reactions to new information about climate change, and for that
particular purpose, it would be most surprising if a nationally representative
sample turned out to be fundamentally different.
14 Percentages may not add up due to rounding.
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tions: 1) Do you consider yourself an environmentalist?  2) Do
you believe that man-made climate change is occurring?  3) Do
you think that the United States was right to sign the recent
Paris agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions?  Partici-
pants indicated their answers on a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 is
strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree).
The responses were correlated (Q1&Q2: r = .26, p < .001;
Q1&Q3: r = .31, p < .001; Q2&Q3: r = .72, p < .001) and thus
summed up to create an overall “climate change belief” score
(CCB) for every subject (acknowledging that the “environ-
mentalist” question does not directly measure belief in climate
change).  Participants were then divided into three groups:
those with high scores (high climate change belief group, N =
108, mean CCB = 13.83±.08), those with medium scores (me-
dium climate change belief group, N = 105, mean CCB =
11.02±.08), and those with low scores (low climate change be-
lief group, N = 89, mean CCB = 7.73±.17).15
Next, we gave participants an initial piece of information
regarding climate change: “Many scientists have said that, ‘By
2100, the average U.S. temperature will rise at least 6°F’ ” and
asked them “How many degrees Fahrenheit do you personally
expect the average U.S. temperature to rise by 2100, if further
regulatory steps are not taken?”  Participants could indicate
their answer by selecting a number from 0 to 12.
The average first estimate that participants gave was
5.40°F±0.156 (mean±SE).  This estimate did not differ between
participants who subsequently received additional good or bad
news, t(300) = 0.36, p = 0.721, two-tailed t-test.  Across partici-
pants, this estimate correlated positively with the climate
change belief score (r = 0.474, p < 0.01).  This was true also
after controlling for age, education, and income (r = 0.408, p <
0.01).  For the high climate change belief group, the average
first estimate was 6.32±.20; for the moderate climate change
belief group, it was 5.93±.25; and it was 3.64±.29 for the low
climate change belief group.  Note that the low climate change
15 Since the questions were on an integer scale, this created clustering of
participants, which prevented portioning them into three equal groups.  The fol-
lowing formula was therefore used to divide participants into three groups:
Where N is the sample size (302 participants), t is the tercile (1,2,3), i is the index
for the participant in ascending rank order with respect to CCB score, S is the set
of all participant indices, and cutoff * is the cutoff point between the respective
terciles.
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belief group did not consist of “climate change deniers”; mem-
bers of the low climate change belief group believed that cli-
mate change would occur, but be smaller than members of the
other two groups expected.
After indicating their initial estimate, participants were
randomly assigned to one of two conditions.  Specifically, they
received information that was either better (good news, 152
participants, 72 female) or worse (bad news, 150 participants,
53 female) than originally received.  In the good news condition,
they were told: “Assume that in the last few weeks, some promi-
nent scientists have reassessed the science, concluded that the
situation is far better than had previously thought, and stated
that unless further regulatory steps are taken, ‘By 2100, the
average U.S. temperature is projected to increase by about 1°F
to 5°F, depending on emissions scenario and climate model.’”
In the bad news condition, they were told: “Assume that in
the last few weeks, some prominent scientists have reviewed
the science and concluded that the situation is far worse than
they had previously thought.  They stated that unless further
regulatory steps are taken, ‘By 2100, the average U.S. tempera-
ture is projected to increase by about 7°F to 11°F, depending on
emissions scenario and climate model.’”
They were then asked to provide their updated estimate:
“How much do you personally believe that the average U.S.
temperature will rise by 2100, if further regulatory steps are not
taken?” by selecting a number from 0 to 12 from a dropdown
menu.16  This was followed by a series of demographic ques-
tions (age, income, ethnicity, party affiliation).
Each participant’s change in beliefs (i.e., update) was cal-
culated as follows: subject’s first estimate minus second esti-
mate in the good news condition, and the reverse for the bad
news condition.  Thus, positive numbers generally indicated
adjustment towards the new evidence, downwards in the for-
mer and upwards in the latter.  These update scores were then
entered into a 2x3 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with a be-
tween-subject factor of condition (good news, bad news) and a
between-subject factor of group (high/medium/low belief in
climate change), with age, education, income, gender, party
16 This, of course, creates a problem if the subject’s true belief is below 0 or
above 12.  However, this restriction, if anything, would have made it more difficult
to observe our results, rather than explain them.
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affiliation, ethnicity, and first estimate controlled for by enter-
ing them as covariates.17
C. Results
There was an interaction between condition and group
(F(2, 284) = 6.28, p = .002, h2 = .04), such that subjects in the
low climate change belief group updated their beliefs more
upon receiving good news than upon receiving bad news (F(1,
75) = 6.96, p = .01, h2 = .09), whereas those in the high climate
change belief group updated their beliefs more upon receiving
bad news than upon receiving good news (F(1, 95) = 8.35, p =
.005, h2 = .08).  Subjects in the medium climate change belief
group did not show a significant difference in updating between
conditions (F(1, 93) = 1.94, p = .167, h2 = .02).
Those in the high climate change belief group updated
their beliefs more upon receipt of bad news than did those in
the low climate change belief group (F(1, 91) = 20.50, p < .001,
h2 = .18).  There was also a difference across groups in updating
upon receipt of good news (F(1, 79) = 6.89, p = .01, h2 = .08).  All
updates were significantly greater than zero (good news, low
belief: t(42) = 3.87, p < .001; good news, medium belief: t(58) =
5.07, p < .001; good news, high belief: t(49) = 4.03, p < .001;
bad news, medium belief: t(45) = 5.79, p < .001; bad news, high
belief: t(57) = 7.58, p < .001)), with the important exception of
the low belief group in the bad news condition, for which belief
change was not different from zero (t(45) = .71, p = .479).
In terms of expected temperature increase, the average es-
timate of low climate change believers decreased by 1.05° in the
good news condition.  In the bad news condition, it increased
by .2° (which, as noted, was not significant).  In the bad news
condition, the average estimate of high climate change believ-
ers increased by 1.94°.  In the good news condition, it fell by
.9°.  For medium climate change believers, the difference be-
tween the two conditions was not significant: 1.25° decrease for
good news and 1.8° increase for bad news.18
There was no main effect of condition (F(1, 284) = .98, p =
.324, h2 = .00) nor significant effect of group (F(2, 284) = 1.45, p
= .237, h2 = .01).  None of the covariates was significant except
for the first estimate (F(1, 284) = 6.67, p = .01, h2 = .02).  We
17 Visual analysis of the scatterplots of the residuals versus the predicted
values in the ANOVAs did not show any linear trends, suggesting that the as-
sumptions of homoscedasticity were not violated.
18 See Figure 1.
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stress that all the results above are given after controlling for
subjects’ first estimate in the ANOVA.
Low CCB
*
Medium CCB
Climate Change Belief Terciles
U
p
d
a
te
High CCB
3
2
1
–1
*
n.sGood news Bad news
Figure 1. Update in Climate Change Belief.
(*) indicates difference between update in response to good news and bad
news within a tercile (p < .05);
(n.s.) indicates non-significant differences between update in response to
good news and bad news within a tercile.
Error bars are standard errors of the mean.
With regard to party affiliation, we note that Democrats
had a higher climate change belief score than Republicans
(t(199) = 7.68, p < .001, two-tailed t-test) and greater first esti-
mates (Democrats = 6.13±0.18 (mean±SE), Republicans,
3.73±0.40, t(199) = 6.19, p < .01, two-tailed t-test).  Updating
behavior across good and bad news did not interact signifi-
cantly with party affiliation (F(1,191) = 2.72, p = .101, h2 = .01),
after controlling for all other demographic variables and cli-
mate change belief scores.
II
POTENTIAL MECHANISMS AND IMPLICATIONS
Our aim here was to study how people adjust their beliefs
about climate change upon receiving information that is better
or worse than previously received.  We found that those with
high climate change belief scores show asymmetrical updating,
changing their beliefs more in response to bad news than good
news, while those with low climate change belief scores show
the opposite asymmetrical updating, changing their beliefs
more in response to good news than bad news (which had
essentially no effect at all).  Those with moderate climate
change belief scores showed no asymmetrical updating.
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What explains the asymmetrical updating for the former
groups?  And what are the implications of our findings for the
formation of beliefs about politics and law in general?
A. Motivated Reasoning and Bayesianism
One possible explanation for the results involves motivated
reasoning.  We have noted that with respect to personally rele-
vant information (say, about how good one’s appearance is or
likely health outcomes), people update their beliefs more in
response to good news than bad news.19  They are motivated to
dismiss the latter or at least to give it less weight.  For beliefs
about others, or about the population at large, this is not nec-
essarily the case.
Here, those with low and high climate change belief scores
may both be invested in their attitudes and update their beliefs
accordingly.  For those with low belief scores, good news is
welcome, because it is both positive (lower temperature rise is
good news for the planet and mankind) and affirming (these
individuals were less alarmed about climate change in the first
place), leading to a large update.  Bad news is both undesirable
for the planet and disconfirming, leading to no effect on belief
update.
Those with high belief scores, on the other hand, were es-
pecially likely to credit bad news.  For them, such news is, in a
sense, affirming, insofar as it supports their concerns and con-
firms that they have been right to have them.20  To that extent,
they may well be motivated to accept bad news.  Good news, by
contrast, causes dissonance.  It suggests that they have been
wrong to focus on climate change, or to be quite alarmed about
it.  With respect to political beliefs, good news (about the
planet, country, or mankind) can evoke such a reaction if and
to the extent that it threatens strongly held convictions and
people’s sense of identity.21
When society is divided, it follows that, whether good or
bad, new information can heighten polarization.  We suspect
that these observations bear on both jury and judicial behav-
ior, as when jurors and judges begin with different convictions
19 See TALI SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS (2012); Eil & Rao, supra note 11; Sharot R
et al., supra note 11. R
20 See Dan M. Kahan et al., The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and
Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 732
(2012), for a series of illuminating observations and findings.
21 See, e.g., Nyhan & Reifler, supra note 10; Brendan Nyhan et al., The R
Hazards of Correcting Myths About Health Care Reform, 51 MED. CARE 127 (2013).
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and are confronted with information from which they should
update.
The second answer does not invoke motivations or emo-
tions; it is purely cognitive and reflects a form of Bayesian-
ism.22  A participant’s prior regarding the likely increase in
temperature is best described as a distribution rather than a
discrete number (e.g., Joe believes the probability that temper-
ature will rise by 5 degrees is 10%, that it will rise by 6 degrees
30%, that it will rise by 7 degrees 20% and so on).  When asked
to declare the likely increase, Joe will give a number represent-
ing the peak of his belief distribution—in this case 6 degrees.
Now imagine two scenarios.  In one, Joe is told scientists be-
lieve the increase is likely to be 7 degrees (bad news) and in the
other that scientists believe it is likely to be 5 degrees (good
news).  Joe is then asked about his new belief.
To form his new belief, Joe will combine his prior with the
evidence and report back the peak of that distribution.  Be-
cause the prior was originally skewed, even if Joe was using
Bayesian statistics to form a posterior, the peaks of the posteri-
ors in these two cases will not be equal distance from the peak
of the prior.  It is possible that the priors of individuals in the
high and low groups were skewed, but in opposite directions.
Although in our study we controlled for people’s “peak priors,”
we did not record the full distribution of their priors.23  Thus,
Bayesianism could in theory be sufficient to account for both
forms of asymmetrical updating here.24  This remains to be
tested.
B. Asymmetrical Updating in Science, Politics, and Law
The findings have implications for how people will update
their beliefs about climate change in particular, and also for
22 For discussion, see Edward Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Does More Speech
Correct Falsehoods?, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (2014).
23 Eil & Rao, supra note 11, use an elegant technique to capture a subject’s R
full distribution of priors with regards to his or her IQ and attractiveness.  They
show that, even after accounting for the full distribution of a subject’s prior
updating, the updating is asymmetric, favoring good news.
24 There are other potential explanations in addition to the two we discuss
here.  For example, strong climate change believers might be more pessimistic in
general, in which case their greater incorporation of bad news would be consistent
with their dispositions.  We could easily imagine a set of pessimistic people who
would be especially likely—for cognitive or affective reasons—to accept informa-
tion suggesting that the world is likely to end up worse than they originally
thought.  In an early test, however, we explored this issue and did not find that
strong climate change believers were more pessimistic in general.  The question
does bear further investigation.
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beliefs about science, politics, and law more generally.  If peo-
ple receive new information about climate change (as is inevita-
ble), and if it is highly variable (as is predictable), we should
expect to see greater polarization.  Those most concerned about
climate change will be more likely to revise their estimates
upwards upon receiving bad news than those who are least
concerned.  Those who are least concerned about climate
change will be more likely to revise their estimates downwards
upon receiving good news than those who are most concerned.
This asymmetry undoubtedly contributes to polarization
with respect to climate change, as both alarming and less
alarming news comes to people’s attention.  Quite apart from
the other factors that contribute to polarization about climate
change, asymmetrical updating should be sufficient to produce
it.25  Recall in this regard that in our study, those with low
climate change belief scores were not skeptics or denialists.
They simply believed that the magnitude of change would be
lower than the two other groups did.  Even so, they were more
moved by good news than by bad news, as those with moderate
climate change belief scores were not.
With respect to beliefs in general, we speculate that in
many domains, something similar will occur.  We could readily
imagine studies of the formation of beliefs about terrorism (how
much terrorism will there be in the next year?), immigration
(for how much violence will immigrants be responsible over a
specified future period?), the Affordable Care Act (what will be
the effect of the act on insurance premiums?), and minimum
wage legislation (how much of a disemployment effect should
be expected from a $12 minimum wage?).  For many people,
good news for the country—in the form of an apparently credi-
ble expert judgment that things will be better than they think—
will have far more weight than bad news.  It is easy to imagine
groups that will accept evidence (good news for the country)
that the Affordable Care Act is not producing increases in in-
surance premiums, or that the $12 minimum wage is not in-
creasing unemployment—and that would be highly reluctant to
accept evidence to the opposite effect (bad news for the
country).
For some groups, however, our findings suggest the possi-
bility that apparently good news of exactly these kinds may
trigger a negative reaction, in part because of people’s desire to
be vindicated—to see their actions and concerns affirmed
25 For other factors, see Kahan et al., supra note 20. R
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rather than contradicted.  Some people have strong invest-
ments in their attitudes, even if the implication is that things
are getting much worse—that terrorism will increase, that im-
migration is producing violence, that climate change will be
devastating, that the Affordable Care Act is producing an in-
crease in insurance premiums, that the $12 minimum wage
produces significant increases in unemployment.  For such
people, it is possible that bad news for the country might there-
fore have more weight than good news.
We speculate that a great deal of polarization in politics
and law is created and fueled in this way.  Every week, if not
every day, it is possible to encounter competing (and appar-
ently plausible) predictions about future states of affairs, sug-
gesting that one’s own current estimates are too optimistic or
too pessimistic.  If the evidence involves one’s own future, good
news will usually have special weight.  But if the evidence in-
volves politics and law, this is not necessarily so.  Some people
will receive objectively good news (things will be better than
expected for the planet or mankind) as such and give it particu-
lar attention in updating.  For others, the same news could
contradict convictions to which they are deeply committed and
receive less weight.  Whenever this is true, the circumstances
are right for polarization—heightened or produced by asym-
metrical updating of diametrically opposite kinds.
A great deal remains to be learned on this topic.  But we
suspect that this difference helps explain why polarization can
increase over time and why agreement can be so hard to ob-
tain, even on highly technical questions.
